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 Public Water, Private Land:
 Origins of the Acreage
 Limitation Controversy,
 1933-1953
 Clayton R. Koppes
 The author is a member of the history department in Oberlin
 College.
 IN 1976 THE Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco
 sent a series of shock waves along clearly defined fault lines of
 California agriculture. The court ruled that the federal recla-
 mation laws dating to 1902 mean what they say: Heavily
 subsidized irrigation water can be distributed only to 160 acres
 per individual landowner, and anyone holding more than a
 quarter section must dispose of the excess land in order to
 receive reclamation water.' The ruling occasioned surprise and
 consternation in some quarters, for it seemed to presage major
 alterations in the land-tenure pattern of the Central Valley of
 California, and potentially on reclamation projects throughout
 the West. The only real occasion for surprise, however, was
 that the issue should have required recourse to the courts at all.
 The acreage limitation policy had been clearly established
 legally, had been praised by both political parties, and seemed
 to be an equitable principle for distributing the benefits of
 'United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d. 1093 (1976). The 3-to-0 opinion was
 written by the senior judge of the circuit, James R. Browning of Great Falls, Montana.
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 608 PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW
 public spending. The Ninth Circuit's ruling raised three ques-
 tions of historical significance. Why was the 160-acre law only
 erratically enforced for three quarters of a century? Why did
 the issue arise in particular in the Central Valley, where the
 land-tenure pyramid presented the very problem the reclama-
 tion laws were designed to avoid? Why did a liberal admini-
 stration in power when the Central Valley Project began
 operation not only fail to enforce the excess land law but also
 raise the most serious threat to the redistributive principle of
 reclamation?
 This article attempts to answer these questions, which lie at
 the root of the modern controversy over the 160-acre law.
 While considering reclamation policy as a whole, the study
 focuses on the Central Valley, which has been the fulcrum of
 the dispute for the past four decades. Interpretations of the
 key role of the Bureau of Reclamation after World War II have
 varied. Some persons contend the bureau upheld the 160-acre
 law. Others, notably Paul S. Taylor and the Ninth Circuit,
 pinpoint the bureau's failure to uphold the acreage limitation,
 but they are concerned mainly with legal analysis.2 This paper,
 drawing on previously unused archival sources, analyzes legis-
 lation, and particularly administrative practices, in the chang-
 'The fullest treatment of the excess land law during the period 1933-1953 is
 David A. Kathka, "The Bureau of Reclamation in the Truman Administration:
 Personnel, Politics, and Policy" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1976),
 chaps. 1-5 (hereafter cited as "Bureau of Reclamation"). Kathka argues that "Truman
 prevented any erosion in the existing policy, but did nothing to strengthen it for the
 future.. ." (p. 108). Perhaps beguiled by Commissioner of Reclamation Michael
 Straus's rhetoric, Kathka emphasizes what the Bureau of Reclamation said rather than
 what it did. William E. Warne, assistant commissioner of reclamation and assistant
 secretary of the Interior from 1947 to 1951, contends that Straus "read the law and
 tightened up the program" (Warne, The Bureau of Reclamation [New York, 1973], 18).
 Paul Wallace Gates devotes much attention to the early years of the excess land law, but
 deals only briefly with the controversy from the 1930s to the present (History of Public
 Land Law Development [Washington, D.C., 1968], chap. 22). The leading authority on
 the 160-acre law, economist Paul S. Taylor, is highly critical of the bureau. Of his many
 writings, "The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy," Yale Law Journal, LXIV
 (1955), 477-514, is most relevant to the period 1933-1953. Two key legal opinions-
 the Ninth Circuit Court decision and an opinion by Solicitor of the Interior Depart-
 ment Frank J. Barry in December 1961 (68 I.D. 370)-are highly critical of the Bureau
 of Reclamation's legal maneuvers. The most unusual perspective is found in Harry J.
 Hogan, Acreage Limitation in the Federal Reclamation Program (Arlington, Va.: National
 Water Commission, 1972, distributed by National Technical Information Service, U.S.
 Department of Commerce). Hogan, a devotee of large-scale farming and the mythical
 free market, provides abundant evidence of the means used to evade compliance with
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 ing political environment from 1933 through 1953. It argues
 that the decisive reason for the demise of the excess land law is
 traceable not merely to the conservative attack but to changes in
 liberal ideology and politics after World War II. The Frank-
 lin D. Roosevelt administration endorsed the family farm and
 the redistributive purpose of reclamation; the Harry S. Truman
 administration subordinated both ideals in favor of commer-
 cial agriculture and economic growth.
 Federal reclamation policy since its inception in the New-
 lands Reclamation Act of 1902 has espoused twin objectives: to
 make barren land productive and to distribute the benefits of
 public spending widely. The Reclamation Bureau has achieved
 the first goal superbly. Federal spending for reclamation
 averaged $8.85 million annually before 1928. With the autho-
 rization of the Boulder Canyon Project in 1928, the nation's
 first true multipurpose project, the bureau assumed its modern
 character as an agency known for massive construction ven-
 tures which provided a prominent role for hydroelectricity as
 well as irrigation. The New Deal's emphasis on public works
 and on public over private electrical power caused the bureau's
 appropriations to spurt to an annual average of $52 million by
 1940; funding reached a one-year record of $359 million in
 1950. The number of acres irrigated under reclamation pro-
 jects reached 4,460,979 in 1946 and 10,929,824 in 1975. At
 first the bureau mainly watered lands that had been taken from
 the public domain. By the 1920s, however, two-thirds of the
 acreage that received project water had been privately held
 the 160-acre law, and he applauds the loopholes: "The flexibility and comprehensive-
 ness of the evasive and meliorative techniques excite admiration. In difficult circum-
 stances over six decades the Bureau of Reclamation and the irrigation farmer, with the
 tacit, and sometimes express, approval of Congress, have brought off what must be
 regarded as a remarkable triumph in public administration" (p. 97).
 Limited to the 160-acre law, this article does not deal with two other controversial
 areas of reclamation policy. One is the widely ignored requirement that water users be
 bona fide residents. The residency requirement was upheld in 1972 by Senior District
 Judge William Murray of Montana visiting in the Southern District of California
 (Yellen v. Hickel, 352 F. Supp. 1300). The Ninth Circuit in 1977 vacated Murray's
 judgment for technical reasons having to do with who has standing to sue, but the court
 did not rule on the merits of the residency question. (U.S. v. Imperial Irrigation District,
 559 F.2d. 509). Some persons believe that enforcement of the residency requirement
 would entail more far-reaching consequences than the acreage limitation. Another
 issue is the sale of water rights. See Joseph L. Sax, "Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A
 Case Study in Federal Subsidy Policy," Michigan Law Review, LXIV (1965), 13-46.
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 when construction began. In the 1930s the agency began to
 provide "supplemental water" to farms that were already
 irrigated but needed more water. In the Central Valley all the
 farms that were to receive bureau water were privately owned
 and in the majority of cases would get supplemental water. The
 application of the acreage limitation was especially sensitive
 and important in the Central Valley, where the bureau was
 putting public water on private land.3
 The second goal--the redistributive principle--was achieved
 at best imperfectly, but it was of crucial importance because of
 the heavy subsidies that water users received. Wide distribu-
 tion of benefits had inhered in reclamation law since the 1902
 act. The father of the principle, Representative Francis G.
 Newlands of Nevada, explained in 1901 that the purpose of
 acreage limitation was "not only to prevent the creation of
 monopoly in the lands now belonging to the Government, but
 to break up existing land monopoly in the West... ." Water
 users at first had to repay construction charges within ten
 years. When farmers on many early projects had trouble
 meeting their payments, however, the repayment period was
 gradually extended to forty years--and with the added bonus
 that repayment would not begin until after a ten-year "devel-
 opment period" had elapsed. Generous though the repayment
 period was, water users' greatest benefit was that they were not
 charged interest. At an interest rate of 3 percent, the subsidy
 would amount to 57 percent of the cost over forty years; at 5
 percent it would equal 74 percent. The Comptroller General of
 the United States estimated that the interest-free financing
 alone gave water users on the Central Valley Project a total
 subsidy of $1.2 billion. Water users received a further subsidy
 on annual operating costs because an average of about sixty-
 five percent of the irrigation expenses were paid by users of
 reclamation-generated electricity. When the Central Valley
 Project began operation in 1947 water users were charged
 3Donald C. Swain, "The Bureau of Reclamation and the New Deal, 1933-1940,"
 Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LXI (1970), 142; Gates, History of Public Land Law Develop-
 ment, 691, 698; House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on
 Water and Power Resources, Hearings on Acreage Limitation Provisions of Reclamation Law,
 94 Cong., 2 sess. (1976), 13.
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 $2.70 per acre-foot. If all the subsidies were eliminated and an
 interest rate of 3 percent were assumed, the charge would have
 been $8.36 per acre-foot; at 5 percent interest, the toll would
 have mounted to $10.80 per acre-foot.4
 The device chosen to insure wide distribution of benefits was
 to restrict an individual landowner to enough water to irrigate
 160 acres. The limit applied to water, not land. The distinc-
 tion was crucial, for water rights were usufructuary rights
 upon which conditions for beneficial use could more easily be
 imposed than on fee simple titles in land. The 160-acre limit
 first found expression in the Reclamation Acts of 1902 and
 1912, but these laws lacked enforcement provisions and land
 speculators often vitiated the social intent. The Reclamation
 Act of 1914 required landowners to dispose of their excess
 lands on terms designated by the Secretary of the Interior if
 they wished to receive project water. Difficulty in enforcing the
 provisions of the 1914 act after a project had been initiated left
 it nearly as fruitless as its predecessors. Accordingly the Omni-
 bus Adjustment Act of 1926 required holders of excess lands to
 sign "recordable contracts" before receiving project water.
 Under these contracts the landholders agreed to sell their
 excess lands within ten years at an appraised price that
 excluded any increased value from irrigation. Recordable
 contracts proved effective on the Vale, Owyhee, and Deschutes
 projects, and suggested that the Omnibus Adjustment Act, if it
 were implemented, could control speculation and realize the
 distributive intent.5
 In an arbitrary mathematical symbol, lawmakers tried to
 express a bundle of economic and social objectives. The ideal
 4Arthur B. Darling, ed., The Public Papers of Francis G. Newlands (2 vols., Boston,
 1932), I, 62; "Acreage Limitation in the Central Valley-A Report on Problem 19,
 Central Valley Project Studies," Sept. 25, 1944, Paul S. Taylor Papers, Bancroft
 Library, University of California, Berkeley; Richard Boke to Edson Abel, Jan. 31, 1947,
 file 742, Records of the Bureau of Reclamation, Record Group 115, National Archives
 (hereafter cited as RG 115); Sax, "Selling Reclamation Water Rights," 13n; Comptroller
 General of the United States, Congress Should Reevaluate the 160-Acre Limitation on Land
 Eligible to Receive Waterfrom Federal Water Resources Projects (Washington, D.C., 1972), 10
 (hereafter cited as Comptroller General report).
 'Yellen v. Hickel, 352 F. Supp. 1300, 1306-1307; Richard K. Pelz, ed., Federal Recla-
 mation and Related Laws Annotated (3 vols., Washington, D.C., 1972), I, 31-89, 177-
 183, 197-198, 376-387; William E. Warne, "Land Speculation," Reclamation Era,
 XXXIII (Aug. 1947), 176-180.
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 of the family farm reflected the agrarian myth; the 160-acre
 threshold was derived from the Homestead Act. On early
 projects a quarter section frequently exceeded the amount a
 family could fully utilize. As farm sizes grew, 160 acres proved
 too small for some soil and climatic conditions. But the disputes
 over 160 acres as a figure too often obscured its importance as a
 symbol. The debate over what size of farm was economically
 sound tended to obscure the point that, from a strict market
 analysis, federal reclamation projects are not economically
 viable to start with. Farms receiving project water are profitable
 in large part only because of the heavy federal subsidy. The
 family farm and a quarter section were vehicles for broader
 purposes: distributing the benefits of public subsidy widely
 during the Progressive era, redistributing wealth during the
 New Deal, and fostering democratic communities.6
 After 1926 Congress dealt with the excess land issue on an
 ad hoc basis. The redistributive principle was extended in two
 instances. The Columbia Basin Project Act of 1937 gave the
 Secretary of the Interior authority to reduce the maximum to
 as little as 40 acres; revision of the act in 1943 permitted him to
 vary the size from 40 to 160 acres depending on the acreage
 needed to establish a viable farm unit. The Secretary also
 received authority to purchase excess lands in order to facili-
 tate their redistribution. Congress applied the 160-acre stan-
 dard to the Arch Hurley (Tucumcari) Project in New Mexico in
 1937, even though the project provided only supplemental
 water. The Department of the Interior firmly supported both
 enactments.7
 Congress also specifically exempted two projects from the
 160-acre restriction: the Colorado-Big Thompson Project in
 6For data on desirable farm sizes on early projects see the report by F. H. Newell,
 Jan. 27, 1913, and the responses from the field on which it was based, File 262-B3,
 General File, 1902-1919, RG 115. Some recent studies suggest that farms of 160 acres,
 or 320 acres for husband and wife, are still economically viable in the Central Valley.
 See George Goldman et al., Economic Effect of Excess Land Sales in the Westlands Water
 District (Berkeley: University of California Division of Agricultural Sciences, Special
 Pub. 3214, June 1977). E. Phillip Leveen argues that large farms are not inherently
 more efficient but reflect in part applications of technology and other matters of social
 choice. See his statement in Senate Select Committee on Small Business and the
 Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hearings on Will the Family Farm Survive in
 America? 94 Cong., 1 and 2 sess. (1975-1976), 189-202.
 'Pelz, Federal Reclamation Laws, I, 596, II, 728-735.
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 Colorado in 1939 and the Truckee Project in Nevada in 1940.
 Both ventures irrigated land at high altitudes and with short
 growing seasons, which supposedly necessitated larger acre-
 ages. The product of congressional pork-barrel politics, the
 exemptions were of dubious economic merit. Perhaps this is
 why Congress stipulated that the two measures established no
 precedents for further exemptions. Endorsements for both
 laws slipped through the Department of the Interior without
 the approval of Secretary Harold L. Ickes, who was livid when
 he learned belatedly of the loopholes.8
 The most serious drawback to realization of the redistribu-
 tive intent had been lax administration. When Ickes inquired
 about the acreage limitation in 1934, the bureau told him it had
 been "a dead letter for years" and that it was better to "let
 sleeping dogs lie."' Little enforcement was attempted until the
 late 1930s for three major reasons. First, legal interpretations
 were clouded. Regulations in force in the 1930s were derived
 in part from a 1914 ruling by Bureau Chief Counsel Will R.
 King which allowed landowners to receive water for more than
 160 acres if construction charges were paid in full on the excess
 lands. King's opinion was based on a dubious reading of the
 1912 act, as would become clear when family-farm adherents
 examined it closely; meanwhile, however, his opinion opened
 an important escape hatch for larger landholders. Another
 legal diversion arose when early in its history the bureau
 allowed a husband and wife to receive water on 160 acres each.
 This informal practice received recognition as a fait accompli
 in a solicitor's decision in 1945. Second, it was often difficult to
 find buyers for excess lands, especially in the 1930s, when
 'Seriously embarrassed by his subordinates' actions, Ickes had little choice but to
 recommend that the President sign the bill; the Secretary phrased the recommendation
 as weakly as possible, however. He passed off the department's position as being
 "neither favorable nor unfavorable," but simply a lack of objection because the Nevada
 conditions were similar to those on Colorado-Big Thompson. Ickes to Harold D. Smith,
 Nov. 25, 1940, file 400.08, RG 115; Pelz, Federal Reclamation Laws, I, 612-613, 712;
 "Providing that Excess-Land Provisions of Federal Reclamation Laws Shall Not Apply
 to Certain Lands," Sen. Rep. 1921, 75 Cong., 3 sess. (1938); "Amending the Federal
 Reclamation Laws," H. Rep. 3036, 76 Cong., 3 sess. (1940); interview with Arthur
 Goldschmidt, head of the Division of Water and Power from 1943 to 1946, New York
 City, April 14, 1978.
 `F. C. Youngblutt, "Suggestions for Legislation," Aug. 12, 1938; R.M.P. to Elwood
 Mead, n.d., ca. Jan. 1934.
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 many farms had been foreclosed. A program of federal
 purchase or government credit for purchasers would have
 promoted the breakup of excess holdings. Third, the bureau
 gave priority to "practical engineering"-the construction and
 operation of the physical works--over reclamation's social
 objectives.'"
 As a result of this weak enforcement, the bureau had at best
 a mixed record in redistribution. A survey of land ownership
 on bureau projects in 1946 revealed that small and medium-
 sized ownerships predominated but on some projects there
 were serious violations of the excess land law. The agency
 provided water to 4,030,167 acres divided among 106,338
 ownerships. The holders of 160 acres or less numbered
 102,853 or 96.6 percent of the total; their farms embraced
 2,802,245 acres or 69.5 percent of the total. In the medium-
 sized category (161 to 640 acres) 3,255 owners held 21.2
 percent of the total. The .3 percent who enjoyed a square mile
 or more held 9.3 percent of the total; these barons owned 50.3
 percent of the excess lands. Overall, 30.5 percent of the acres
 were in holdings which exceeded the limit. In many cases the
 landholding pattern probably reflected the conditions that
 existed before reclamation projects were initiated rather than
 the effects of enforcement. Nevertheless, the bureau, in part
 fortuitously, had avoided large-scale subsidies to large farms
 and agribusiness corporations which would have solidified a
 skewed landholding pattern."
 The Central Valley Project (CVP) encountered, however, the
 very land tenure problem Representative Newlands had
 "OJohn C. Page to Leo L. Heisel, Jan. 4, 1939; Page to Under Secretary of the
 Interior, Jan. 21, 1939; see also replies of field officers to Page, Dec. 1940-Feb. 1941,
 file 400.08, RG 115; 43 L.D. 339 (1914); Opinion M-34172, "Application of the Excess
 Land Provisions of the Federal Reclamation Laws to Community Property States,"
 Aug. 21, 1945, reprinted in House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, "Central
 Valley Project Documents," H.Doc. 85-246, 85 Cong., 1 sess. (1957), II, 692-698. The
 phrase "practical engineering" was used by S. T. Harding, a prominent California
 water engineer, who lamented the department's awakening to the social implications of
 reclamation in contrast to its earlier attitude. Senate Committee on Public Lands,
 Hearings on Exemption of Certain Projects from Land-Limitation Provisions of Federal
 Reclamation Laws, 80 Cong., 1 sess. (1947), 120.
 "U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Land Ownership Survey on Federal Reclamation Projects
 (Washington, D.C., 1946), 29-53. The total number of acres on reclamation projects in
 1946 reached 4,460,767. The bureau study excluded 430,600 acres for which a
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 feared. The bureau's greatest venture, CVP by the 1970s
 carried a total price tag of $2.3 billion, of which $1.1 billion had
 been allocated to irrigation and had to be repaid to the
 government; CVP irrigated 2.3 million acres. The pyramidal
 land structure of the Central Valley was probably more severe
 than in any other state. In 1945 the Bureau of Agricultural
 Economics studied irrigable landholdings in three counties-
 Madera, Tulare, and Kern-which appeared to be representa-
 tive of the CVP service area. It found that 955,700 irrigable
 acres were divided among 9,551 owners. Some 8,417 owners,
 who enjoyed 160 acres or less apiece, held 377,900 acres or
 40 percent of the total, compared to nearly 70 percent on other
 bureau projects; in other words, 60 percent of the land
 holdings exceeded the acreage limit. Medium-sized farms of
 161 to 640 acres totaled 272,000 acres or 28 percent of the
 whole; they were held by 952 owners or 10 percent of the total.
 Large farms (641 acres or more)--owned by 182 owners or 2
 percent of the total--embraced 305,800 acres, or 70 percent of
 all excess lands, compared to 50 percent on other bureau
 projects. The farms larger than a square mile comprised 32
 percent of the total acreage, more than triple the 9.3 percent
 on bureau projects elsewhere. If the agency's minimal enforce-
 ment practice carried over to CVP, the bureau would find itself
 subsidizing massively the largest economic interests.12
 CVP, said Arthur Goldschmidt, one of Icke's advisers, of-
 fered "the best opportunity now available for correcting the
 land pattern of California." The Secretary agreed. "I am de-
 cidedly of the opinion that we ought to do everything in our
 power to enforce the 160-acre limitation... ," Ickes said in
 1940. The department readied an enforcement campaign in
 breakdown by size was unavailable. For further analysis of landholding patterns on
 Bureau of Reclamation projects and in the Central Valley, see Clayton R. Koppes, "The
 Bureau of Reclamation's Excess Land Law: Origins of the Modern Controversy, 1933-
 1961," California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper No. 200
 (March 1978), 11-23.
 "2Comptroller General report, 6, 10-11; Charles E. Coate, "Water, Power, and
 Politics in the Central Valley Project, 1933-1967" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
 California, Berkeley, 1969), chap. 2; Edwin E. Wilson and Marion Clawson, Agricultural
 Land Ownership and Operation in the Southern San Joaquin Valley (Berkeley, 1945); Carey
 McWilliams, Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California (Boston,
 1939), chap. 1.
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 preparation for the beginning of CVP operations after the
 war's end. Harry W. Bashore, a veteran agency engineer who
 seemed more attuned to Ickes's social goals, became commis-
 sioner of reclamation in 1943. The department launched two
 dozen major studies of the potential social effects of the
 project. In November 1943 Ickes, Bashore, and President
 Franklin D. Roosevelt told the National Reclamation Associa-
 tion-an opponent of the excess land law-that they intended
 to apply the statute to all CVP lands.13
 The enforcement campaign reflected a maturation of Ickes's
 and his advisers' commitment to the redistributive purposes
 possible because of the growth of the reclamation program.
 One goal was public power. As huge dams such as Bonneville
 on the Columbia neared completion, the crucial question
 became how the electricity at the dams would be distributed.
 Moderate and conservative interests wanted the government to
 sell power to private utilities and to consider power a "cash
 crop" for which the government got top dollar. But Ickes and
 his liberal coterie insisted that the government string its own
 transmission lines, give priority to municipal and cooperative
 distribution facilities, and levy low rates. Since he found the
 Bureau of Reclamation too conservative, Ickes formed a Divi-
 sion of Water and Power in his office in 1941 to supervise
 power distribution and related issues. The division's first head,
 lawyer Abe Fortas, promptly announced: "Water and power
 must be distributed to the people without private profit.""
 The second goal was what can be called the "community New
 Deal." Beyond the ideal of the family farm, New Deal com-
 munity programs embraced diffused property ownership as
 the first step toward a planned, ideal cooperative common-
 wealth. Community New Dealers had an organic view of
 13Arthur Goldschmidt to Ickes, April 10, 1944, file 8-3, part 4, Records of the Office
 of the Secretary of the Interior, Record Group 48, National Archives; Ickes to Page,
 March 30, 1940, file 400.08, RG 115; see the messages of Ickes and Roosevelt in
 Proceedings: Irrigation War Food Conference and 12th Annual Meeting, National Reclamation
 Association, Denver, Colorado, October 27-28-29, 1943 (Washington, D.C., 1944),
 201-203; Kathka, "Bureau of Reclamation," 55.
 "Abe Fortas, "Relationship of Power to Reclamation," Reclamation Era, XXXI
 (Dec. 1941), 312; Koppes, "Conservation and the Continuity of American Liberalism,
 1933- 1953," California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper No. 174
 (June 1978).
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 society; it should be roughly egalitarian, and cooperation and
 group life should assume more importance than traditional
 individualism. Franklin Roosevelt believed that reclamation
 projects should not benefit "the man who happens to own the
 land at the time" but should provide small tracts that would
 "give first chance to the 'Grapes of Wrath' families of the
 nation." He envisioned a comprehensively planned Columbia
 Valley Project that could support 80,000 new families in
 agriculture and 20,000 others in small agriculture-related
 businesses.15
 Before the enforcement campaign could bear fruit, the
 department had to fight off a conservative challenge that
 threatened the very existence of the 160-acre law. In March
 1944 Representative Alfred J. Elliott of California attached a
 rider to the rivers and harbors appropriation bill that would
 have exempted CVP from the acreage limitation. Elliott, a
 farmer from the Central Valley town of Tulare where some of
 the largest landholdings were located, accused the department
 of "trying to socialize agriculture and force Communism upon
 the people of the San Joaquin Valley." Land might be sold to
 undesirable people, he warned; "remember the Japanese and
 the trouble we had with them." Caught by surprise, the depart-
 ment could not keep the House from adopting the Elliott
 rider.16
 As the battle shifted to the Senate, the bureau tried to devise
 a compromise. The Elliott amendment had crystallized under-
 standing of the home-building and antimonopoly components
 of reclamation policy among bureau personnel, Commissioner
 Bashore noted. But many bureau officials felt the 160-acre law
 was too strict and difficult to administer in an area of estab-
 lished agriculture, such as the Central Valley. Moreover, they
 doubted they could win a straight-out fight to preserve the law.
 Some went so far as to suggest that the acreage limitation
 should not apply to anyone holding land before CVP was
 "'Clayton R. Koppes, "From New Deal to Termination: Liberalism and Indian Policy,
 1933-1953," Pacific Historical Review, XLVI (1977), 547-550; Roosevelt to Ickes,
 Dec. 21, 1939, box 75, President's Secretary's File, Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D.
 Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.
 '"Elliott quoted in Dinuba Sentinel, April 10, 1947, in file 742--Central Valley,
 RG 115; Warne to Bashore, March 20, 1944, file 400.08, ibid.
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 authorized. A more moderate proposal would have given
 water to all landowners but levied a surcharge on water
 delivered to excess lands.17
 Secretarial officials dismissed the proposals out of hand. The
 bureau's attitude was "not even that of an enlightened banker,"
 said Fortas, now Under Secretary. The secretariat refused to
 compromise an ideological issue-the type of society to be
 encouraged by federal subsidy. Assistant Secretary Oscar L.
 Chapman considered the rider part of a larger attack on the
 community New Deal that pitted "the organized big men
 against the unorganized little men; the kulaks against the
 peasants; the haves against the have-nots." Department spokes-
 men emphasized the importance of distributing the benefits of
 the subsidy widely and of developing farm communities. They
 relied on a study by a young University of California-trained
 anthropologist, Walter Goldschmidt, which contrasted social
 patterns in two Central Valley towns. Arvin, characterized by
 large farms, had a more unequal distribution of income, more
 farm laborers, and fewer retail businesses and social amenities.
 Dinuba, characterized by small to moderate-sized farms,
 showed higher and more evenly distributed income, more
 farm owners and retail businesses, and greater social cohesion.
 Arvin represented impermanence and alienation; Dinuba,
 stability and community. Goldschmidt attributed the differ-
 ences "confidently and overwhelmingly to the scale-of-farming
 factor."'18
 Committed to the redistributive principle, members of the
 department secretariat knew political backing could be mobi-
 "1Commissioner of Reclamation, Administrative Letter No. 50, Oct. 23, 1944;
 Charles E. Carey to Bashore, May 16, 1944; Warne to Carey, Oct. 5, 1944, file 400.08,
 RG 115; R. B. Williams to S. O. Harper, July 5, 1944; Harper to Williams, July 18,
 1944, box 6, Sinclair Harper Papers, Western History Research Center, Coe Library,
 University of Wyoming, Laramie; Kathka, "Bureau of Reclamation," 59.
 "'Fortas to Ickes, Nov. 10, 1944, box 258, Harold L. Ickes Papers, Manuscript
 Division, Library of Congress; Chapman to Ickes, Oct. 13, 1943, box 67, Oscar L.
 Chapman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.; Walter Gold-
 schmidt's study was published by the Senate Special Committee to Study Problems of
 American Small Business under the title, "Small Business and the Community: A Study
 in Central Valley of California on Effects of Scale of Farm Operations," Committee
 Print 13, 79 Cong., 2 sess. (1946), see esp. 29, 45-50; see also Walter Goldschmidt, As
 You Sow (New York, 1947); and Richard S. Kirkendall, "Social Science in the Central
 Valley of California: An Episode," California Historical Society Quarterly, LXIII (1964),
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 lized. Support came from some farm organizations, church
 groups, labor unions, and veterans groups. Liberal to moder-
 ate senators praised the family farm. The most devoted ally
 was Robert M. La Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin, who had become
 aware of the social problems created by the Central Valley's
 land tenure pyramid during his investigation of migratory
 labor. La Follette and his allies threatened to filibuster if the
 Elliott amendment were included in the bill, and the Senate
 conferees insisted it be deleted. Since House conferees re-
 mained adamant on keeping it, the rivers and harbors bill was
 lost until the next session of Congress, when the measure
 passed without the amendment. The deadlock on the bill-an
 extraordinary fate for pork-barrel legislation-helped solidify
 eastern and southern senators behind the 160-acre law. The
 Interior Department scored another victory in 1944 when it
 got the Senate to insert the acreage limitation principle into the
 bill authorizing the Pine Flat Dam on the Kings River in
 California. Although Roosevelt and Ickes wanted the bureau-
 the logical agency-to build the dam, the Army Corps of
 Engineers used its congressional support to win the assign-
 ment. The Corps promised large landowners exemption from
 the acreage limitation; while the department might have of-
 fered the same lure in order to get the dam, it stuck to the
 160-acre principle.19
 After the Interior Department's successful defense in 1944,
 however, disquieting signs began to multiply. The years 1945-
 1946 marked a transition in both personnel and policy. Fortas
 resigned at the end of 1945. In February 1946 Ickes resigned
 from the Cabinet following a celebrated dispute with the new
 President, Harry S. Truman, over the nomination of oil
 millionaire Edwin Pauley as Under Secretary of the Navy.
 "Honest Harold's" successor was Julius A. Krug, an electrical
 power engineer who had served as chairman of the War
 Production Board, which had epitomized cooperation between
 195-218. A recent study tends to confirm Goldschmidt. It finds two distinct rural
 political economies in California--one characterized by farm communities, family-sized
 farms, and small business; the other by large-scale, corporate, nonresident farms. See
 Merrill D. Goodall, John D. Sullivan, and Timothy de Young, California Water: A New
 Political Economy (Montclair, N.J., 1978), esp. p. 100.
 '9Cong. Rec., 78 Cong., 2 sess. (1944), 9494.
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 big industry and government. Krug, a protege of Bernard
 Baruch and David Lilienthal, had mildly liberal leanings; the
 new Secretary's main interest appeared to lie with expansion of
 federal power facilities, but shorn of their redistributive poten-
 tial. A "much more passive" influence on the department than
 Ickes, Krug tended to wait until a "crisis built up so that he was
 forced into a corner and it had to be solved," noted one of his
 assistant secretaries, Warner W. Gardner. Krug elevated Oscar
 Chapman to Under Secretary, a position he held until Decem-
 ber 1949, when he assumed the secretaryship upon Krug's
 resignation. Chapman, though among the more liberal mem-
 bers of Truman's Cabinet, changed his ideas and tacked to the
 right in an act of political survival. Amiable and conciliatory by
 nature, he hated to make tough decisions even when forced
 into a corner.20
 Krug and Chapman allowed the new commissioner of recla-
 mation, Michael Straus, much freedom of action. A former
 Chicago newspaperman, Straus had been an effective publicist
 for Ickes in the 1930s. Assistant Secretary from 1943-1945,
 Straus took an ostensible demotion to serve as commissioner of
 reclamation from 1946-1953. The new commissioner's atti-
 tude was "largely political and bureaucratic in the best sense,"
 observed Fortas. "He is principally interested in obtaining
 work and jurisdiction and is not greatly interested in the social
 and economic problems." Straus presided over the bureau's
 greatest expansion. Bureau funding reached a one-year record
 of $359 million in 1950, and its annual appropriations during
 the Truman administration were higher than for any other
 period. Under Straus the bureau's ambitions knew few bounds.
 The agency attempted-unsuccessfully-to gain congressional
 authorization to build dams in Hells Canyon, the deepest gorge
 on the continent, and at Echo Park in Dinosaur National
 Monument, which touched off the bitterest fight between
 developers and preservationists over the inviolability of the
 national park system.21
 The bureau's expansion reflected a more general shift in
 liberal thought. The redistributive concepts important to one
 "2Warner W. Gardner oral history interview (Truman Library), p. 30; Koppes,
 "Conservation and the Continuity of American Liberalism," 15.
 "'Fortas to Ickes, Nov. 10, 1944, box 258, Ickes Papers.
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 wing of New Deal thought were submerged by the new
 emphasis on economic growth. Truman administration econo-
 mists, notably Leon Keyserling, argued that the wartime part-
 nership between government and business had proved capital-
 ism capable of an almost unlimited expansion that would
 obviate the need for redistributive policies. Economic growth
 constituted "the very essence of our development as a nation,"
 said Chapman. The growth emphasis meant that the Bureau of
 Reclamation placed more importance on increasing the capac-
 ity of dam and irrigation works; how the products were distri-
 buted became secondary. Valley authorities, for whom Ickes
 and Fortas held high hopes, gradually lost favor in the depart-
 ment until by 1950 Chapman had abandoned them entirely.
 He also shifted from priority for low-rate federally controlled
 distribution of power in CVP to distribution through Pacific
 Gas and Electric Company at higher costs and with substantial
 profits for the private utility. The partnership between govern-
 ment and industry for maximum production provided the
 economic capacity to finance the Cold War, and economic
 growth seemed to represent a capitalist alternative to redis-
 tributive policies with their tinge of radicalism. As returning
 veterans were absorbed into industry and urban areas, and
 when the feared postwar depression did not materialize, some
 of the incentive for an agricultural resettlement program dissi-
 pated. A department-wide seminar in late 1945 on postwar
 policy revealed that the ideal of the family farm as a way of life
 was giving way to a primary concern with the "development of
 successful farms operated as business enterprises." The de-
 partment should not abandon the family farm outright, its
 land planners said, but it "should recognize that this is a period
 of cultural transition." Indeed, the year 1945 marked the
 beginning of what historian John Shover has termed the "great
 disjuncture" in American agriculture, when technology, large-
 scale farming, and government policy worked a fundamental
 alteration in the structure of agriculture and rural life.22
 The acreage limitation restriction came under attack again
 when the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress convened
 "ZEvelyn Cooper to C. Girard Davidson, April 30, 1946, box 95, Joel D. Wolfsohn
 Files, Records of the General Land Office, Record Group 49, National Archives; John
 Shover, First Majority--Last Minority: The Transforming of Rural Life in America (DeKalb,
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 in 1947. California Senator Sheridan Downey, a Sacramento
 lawyer who specialized in irrigation cases and had "substantial"
 landholdings in the Central Valley, introduced a bill to exempt
 CVP, the San Luis Valley Project in Colorado, and the Valley
 Gravity Project in Texas from the 160-acre law. Though he
 had been a Bull Moose Progressive in Wyoming, and Upton
 Sinclair's candidate for lieutenant governor of California in
 1934, Downey turned out to be increasingly conservative after
 reaching the Senate in 1938. He and his supporters stressed
 the difficulties of applying the limit in an area of established
 agriculture. The bureau was "planning and plotting the de-
 struction of a free economy to institute totalitarian rule over
 the Central Valley," he charged. The opponents of redistribu-
 tion held a strongly individualistic view that subordinated
 community values to economic goals achieved through private
 enterprise. Central Valley agriculture and its accompanying
 social patterns resulted from the inexorable working of natural
 geographic and economic forces, they argued; the market
 rewarded those who demonstrated the most skill. They called
 on the department to "just put water on all of the land and
 treat all of our citizens without discrimination." Government
 policy should assist in the release of individual energies, as
 James Willard Hurst observed in discussing nineteenth-
 century legal theories; government efforts to achieve greater
 equality of result were anathema.23
 Ill., 1976), 141; Willard W. Cochrane and Mary E. Ryan, American Farm Policy, 1948-
 1973 (Minneapolis, 1976), 26; Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman
 and American Liberalism (New York, 1973), 297-303; Koppes, "Conservation and the
 Continuity of American Liberalism," 19-24. Reflecting on his experience in the
 solicitor's office from 1944 to 1969, former Solicitor Edward Weinberg acknowledged
 that "both within the executive branch and in the Congress there has been less than a
 burning desire to provide the staffing and funds necessary to do an effective job." The
 department, the bureau, and Congress interpreted the bureau's role "as the construc-
 tion and operation of water supply facilities for the purpose of improving the general
 economy of the areas affected, and of providing the national economy with increased
 supplies of food and fiber. Administration of the excess land laws, which consists
 basically of telling people that they must change their ways and which necessarily
 involves time consuming and often burdensome procedures, has been relegated to a
 secondary role. I think this regretable [sic], but nevertheless it is a fact." Will the Family
 Farm Survive in America?, 154.
 "3Senate Committee on Commerce, Hearings on Rivers and Harbors Omnibus Bill:
 California Central Valley Project, 78 Cong., 2 sess. (1944), 623-633, 676, 702; see also
 Senate Committee on Public Lands, Hearings on Exemption of Certain Projects, passim;
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 The Downey bill caught the Interior Department searching
 for an acreage limitation policy. The bureau had begun to slide
 back toward the position it had assumed before the Ickes
 secretariat championed the acreage limitation. The bureau
 continued to argue that some policy changes were desirable
 and, in any case, politically necessary. Its committee on com-
 promise legislation professed adherence to the family farm
 ideal but proposed various adjustments upward. The most
 significant allowed holders of any amount of excess land to pay
 a surcharge and continue receiving supplemental water if the
 Secretary determined it was necessary "to prevent the deteri-
 oration of established communities." Krug, however, disliked
 the proposals because they were too vague and did not
 eliminate all subsidies to large landowners. He doubted the
 160-acre limit would harm established communities. Rather, "a
 breakup of the large holdings might in time improve rather
 than deteriorate the community," he said. He seemed particu-
 larly impressed by the arguments made for a firm stand by
 Richard Boke, a veteran New Deal publicist and bureaucrat
 whom Ickes had appointed in 1945 to head reclamation
 Region II, which supervised the CVP. "Frankly, no suggestion
 has yet been made that is more in keeping with the principles
 of Reclamation than the acreage limitation in the present law,"
 the Secretary pointed out in January 1947. He told the bureau
 to hold the line at 160 acres.24
 Straus and the bureau found themselves in a dilemma. They
 did not want to fight for the 160-acre law, but they dared not
 abandon it outright. Several political inducements encouraged
 the bureau to weaken the 160-acre law. Some of the projects
 the agency wanted to undertake were not feasible if ownership
 were limited to 160 acres. Public power generation, which was
 controversial in itself, might be retarded if controversy swirled
 James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United
 States (Madison, 1957); Kathka, "Bureau of Reclamation," 56.
 "4William E. Warne, Clifford Fix, and G. W. Lineweaver to Straus, enclosing "Policy
 Basis for Landownership Aspects of Reclamation Program," Dec. 31, 1946; Straus to
 Gardner, July 10, 1946; Fix for files, Feb. 13, 1947; Krug to Straus, n.d., ca. Jan. 13,
 1947; Gardner note, Jan. 13, 1947, file 742, RG 115; Krug to Cyrus E. Woodward,
 Jan. 27, 1947, file 742-Central Valley, ibid.; interview with economist Paul S. Taylor,
 Berkeley, Calif. Dec. 16, 1977.
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 around the excess land law. Most importantly, the bureau was
 trying to fight off threats to its empire in California by two
 agencies that promised relief from the 160-acre law. The
 Corps of Engineers still hoped to operate the Kings River dam.
 The state of California toyed with purchasing CVP from the
 federal government; under the California Water Project
 adopted in 1958, the state, rather than the federal govern-
 ment, developed new irrigation areas. The position of the
 corps and the state created pressure for the bureau to modify
 the acreage limitation.25
 Yet Straus could not abandon the excess land law openly,
 even if Krug was willing. Straus knew, as his predecessor had
 observed, that the 160-acre law was indispensable to reclama-
 tion appropriations, particularly among liberals, who were the
 most receptive to federal spending. Nonwesterners in Con-
 gress looked askance at reclamation until they learned it was "a
 settlement and homesteading program," said Bashore. "As
 long as reclamation projects fulfill that purpose, public en-
 dorsements and public funds can be secured for reclamation
 projects... ." To a large extent the bureau's political dilemma
 distilled into a question of constituency. A powerful, well
 organized constituency stood to benefit directly from abandon-
 ment of the excess land law, but there was no group at the time
 which stood to benefit directly from the law's enforcement.
 While such a group could perhaps have been created, as
 occurred for legislation supporting industrial unions in the
 1930s, it remained a potential rather than an active force.
 Meanwhile, the preservation of the redistributive principle
 relied on a generalized group for which the 160-acre law was
 but one of many social welfare goals.26
 To escape from this political dilemma Straus devised a subtle
 strategy that called for rhetorical adherence to the acreage
 limitation but which, through a program limited to "technical
 compliance" with the law, eschewed actual enforcement. Testi-
 "Senate Committee on Public Lands, Hearings on Exemption of Certain Projects, 94;
 Paul S. Taylor, California Social Scientist (3 vols., oral history interview, Bancroft
 Library), II, 208.
 "6Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation, Hearings on Central Valley Project,
 California, 78 Cong., 2 sess., (1944), 192; see also the remarks of Senator Paul Douglas
 in the Cong. Rec., 88 Cong., 1 sess. (1962), 5711.
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 fying in 1947, Straus defended the land limitation, but he
 restricted his remarks mainly to those laws aimed at curbing
 speculation and keeping the time-honored limit on the statute
 books. Straus exhibited little of the ideological fervor that had
 characterized the defense in 1944; the bureau's contribution to
 correcting the land pattern and to building community was
 conspicuously absent. The commissioner's rhetorical defense
 mollified supporters of the law. But at the same time he
 explained to opponents how to avoid its substance through
 technical compliance. Straus volunteered that if a corporation
 had ten stockholders, it would be entitled to water for 160 acres
 per partner. He also suggested that a landowner could deed
 out 320-acre parcels to his married relatives and children and
 remain in technical compliance. The commissioner raised
 laughter when he acknowledged that such devices would not
 constitute "spiritual compliance," but he hastened to say that
 technical compliance was good enough for him. A dismayed
 Downey termed Straus's recitation "blithe." Downey continued
 to insist that the law was harsh and unworkable. Straus cajoled:
 do not worry, we are flexible. Perhaps because the commis-
 sioner's virtuoso performance took the sting out of acreage
 limitation, the Downey bill died in committee.27
 Quietly and apparently without informing Krug, Straus had
 already begun to implement the technical compliance pro-
 gram. Thwarted in its attempt to change the law legislatively,
 the bureau altered the law administratively. Technical com-
 pliance entailed two problems-bringing older projects with
 long-standing violations into compliance and devising escape
 hatches for new projects. The agency struck first at projects
 already in operation, particularly those authorized before the
 1926 act introduced recordable contracts. Although the 1946
 landownership survey claimed that enforcement had reduced
 violations to a minimal 3.7 percent, Straus acknowledged
 privately that many "serious violations" had to be corrected.
 Regional directors stressed that compliance would be obtained
 only when excess landowners realized enforcement would
 "1Senate Committee on Public Lands, Hearings on Exemption of Certain Projects,
 104-108, 257.
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 proceed "at any cost," including shutting off the water of
 recalcitrant owners. The commissioner's office shrank from
 such tactics, however; it would not go beyond voluntary
 measures.28
 Voluntarism required new exceptions. Rather than force
 immediate breakup by withholding water, Straus decided to
 apply the recordable contract technique. The excess land-
 owners, who had been receiving water they were not entitled to
 for as long as four decades, could now receive water for
 another decade before having to sell. Some regional directors
 complained that the grace period was excessive. "No progress
 towards securing compliance will be achieved until the end of
 that period," said one; "efforts toward enforcement made so
 far would be largely nullified." This tactic suffered from the
 further disability that it lacked specific statutory authority, said
 Chief Counsel Clifford Fix. He got the solicitor to approve the
 stratagem, nevertheless, because he found it analogous to the
 purpose of breaking up the larger holdings. Although Fix
 cautioned that "we should avoid expressing the idea that any
 degree of 'compliance' with the statute is thus effected," the
 bureau happily transferred these older excess lands to the "not
 in violation" category as soon as they came under recordable
 contracts.29
 Another, more far-reaching administrative device-acceler-
 ated or lump-sum payment of construction charges-struck
 directly at the redistributive principle. Straus theorized that the
 acreage limitation would lapse as soon as construction charges
 were paid off. During the normal forty-year period for payout,
 owners of more than 160 acres would have to dispose of their
 excess lands to receive project water. But if the payout period
 2"Straus to Regional Director, Boise, Idaho, Dec. 10, 1946; H. E. Robbins to Straus,
 Feb. 21, 1950; Fix to Straus, July 17, 1947, file 742, RG 115.
 29E. A. Moritz to Straus, Aug. 15, 1947; Fix to Straus, July 17, 1947, ibid. Landowners
 always hoped that during the ten-year grace period a change in policy or some new
 technicality would in the end stave off disposition. But even if they had to sell, the
 economic benefits from a decade of subsidized water were ample. Harry Horton,
 counsel for the Imperial Irrigation District, explained the willingness of some land-
 owners to sign recordable contracts: "He thinks if he gets water for 10 years...
 without having to sell it, he can make enough out of it so he can afford to sell the land at
 any old price." Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on
 Irrigation and Reclamation, Hearings on Acreage Limitation (Reclamation Law) Revision,
 85 Cong., 2 sess., (1958), 87-88.
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 were accelerated, or perhaps even coincided with the initial
 operation date of the project, no one would have to dispose of
 any excess lands to receive project water. This proposition
 reduced reclamation policy to the outlook of a banker inter-
 ested only in the return on his capital investment, for it ignored
 the continuing heavy subsidies large landowners would receive
 during the project's operations. It was even less effective than
 the surcharge proposals, which would have recovered part of
 the operating subsidy.30
 Accelerated payout needed a veneer of legal respectability.
 The associate solicitor, Felix Cohen, provided it in October
 1947 by simply putting his name to an opinion, M-35004,
 supplied two days earlier by D. M. Hudson of the office of the
 chief counsel of the bureau. The Hudson-Cohen opinion held
 that early payout of construction charges would free excess
 lands from the limit whether they were covered by water-right
 applications, which were filed by individuals, or whether they
 came under the joint liability contracts of such organizations as
 irrigation districts. The opinion turned on Section 3 of the
 1912 act, which read as follows: ". .. no person shall at any one
 time or in any manner, except as hereinafter otherwise pro-
 vided, acquire, own, or hold irrigable land for which entry or
 water-right application shall have been made... before final
 payment in full of all installments of building and betterment
 charges shall have been made... per single ownership of
 private land for which a water-right may be purchased .. . nor
 in any case in excess of one hundred and sixty acres, nor shall
 water be furnished under said acts nor a water right sold or
 recognized for such excess... ." The opinion relied on King's
 instructions of 1914, which was interpreted as saying flatly that
 early payout removed the acreage limitation on lands held
 under water right applications.31
 Having established this principle for the lands held by
 individuals, Hudson applied it to tracts covered by joint-
 liability contracts in irrigation districts. In the Reclamation Acts
 of 1922 and 1926 district contracts supplanted water-right
 30Straus to Mastin G. White, Sept. 19, 1947, file 742, RG 115.
 "Hudson draft, Oct. 20, 1947; Cohen to Straus, Opinion M-35004, Oct. 22, 1947,
 ibid.
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 applications; he argued that with these instruments Congress
 desired merely a change of form, not of policy. Consistency
 demanded that the same early payout provisions he had just
 established for the individual contracts should apply to district
 contracts. "Otherwise, substantially different acreage restric-
 tions might result" simply because joint-liability contracts had
 superseded water-right applications. He held therefore that,
 according to Section 3 of the 1912 act, lands receiving water
 under a joint-liability contract were relieved of the excess-land
 restrictions upon full payment of contruction charges.32
 The opinion was riddled with problems. In December 1961
 Solicitor Frank J. Barry overruled it with an exhaustive
 opinion that left the 1947 statement in tatters. In 1976 the
 Ninth Circuit expressed amazement at the Hudson-Cohen
 opinion's "obvious" errors and "surprising superficiality."
 The court attributed the legal flaws to the bureau's political
 maneuvering.33
 One of the principal problems with opinion M-35004 was
 that it relied on the instructions devised by King in 1914, and
 misconstrued them to boot. King's findings had been "reached
 largely on 'feel and hunch', with not much law to support
 it ... ," cautioned a regional counsel in 1947. The phrase "nor
 in any case in excess of one hundred and sixty acres" appeared
 32Opinion M-35004. Kathka interprets Straus's technical compliance program as an
 attempt to plug the loopholes in reclamation law instead of seeing it as a means to use
 them to the fullest and, indeed, to open new ones (pp. 102-108). Fix extended the
 Hudson-Cohen opinion even further in 1948. An entire water user district might not
 want to employ the accelerated payment option, but individual landowners might,
 although they would be blocked by the joint-liability contract. Fix fused disparate
 sections of the 1912 act ("even though the words of the 1912 Act themselves are not
 aptly descriptive" of the situation) with a section of the 1926 act (although "admittedly,
 the provision ... does not apply specifically to the question we have here"). The effect
 of his action was to open the lump-sum payment possibility to individuals even though
 they were covered by joint-liability contracts. None of the regional counsellors he asked
 for advice had sensed these possibilities (Fix to Straus, Sept. 3, 1948, Administrative
 Letter 303, Supp. 1 - Attachment #1, Taylor Papers, Bancroft Library). The Dwight
 Eisenhower administration generally followed the lines of Straus's technical compliance
 program. In this case, however, it tightened the law when Solicitor of the Interior
 Elmer F. Bennett overturned Fix's interpretation (64 I.D. 273). On Eisenhower-era
 policy, particularly the Kings River controversy, see the Reclamation files in the Fred
 Seaton Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, especially the C. Petrus
 Peterson memorandum, "Kings River Contract," n.d. ca. June 1957, and Seaton to
 Philip A. Gordon, July 12, 1957.
 3"68 I.D. 370; United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F. 2d 1093, 1139, 1140
 (1976).
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 to mandate the acreage limitation. But assuming the section
 was ambiguous, Hudson might have had recourse to legisla-
 tive history; instead he relied on King, who had not read
 legislative history either. The misreading stemmed from the
 failure to realize that King was dealing with the normal, not an
 accelerated, payout period. Secretary of the Interior Walter
 Fisher said in 1914 that Section 3 would "prevent the consoli-
 dation of holdings" until full payment of the building charge
 had been made. "By that time it is believed that the land will be
 in the hands of permanent settlers and speculative holdings
 eliminated." This was because, at the time of the enactment of
 the 1912 law, an individual could not-at least before the
 normal payout period-receive water for lands in excess of 160
 acres. Furthermore, as Solicitor Barry pointed out, King had
 said only that the 1912 act could be construed "to permit"
 delivery of water to excess lands after payout, not that such
 deliveries "could be demanded as a matter of right." Barry
 argued that even after the normal payout period, the Secretary
 of the Interior could permit the delivery of water to excess
 lands only if it fulfilled the purpose of establishing family
 farms.34
 More serious still, M-35004 ignored key provisions of the
 acts of 1914 and 1926. These laws added the "crucial" require-
 ment that excess lands be sold or recordable contracts signed
 before their owners received project water. King's instructions
 did not encompass the 1914 act, which was passed six weeks
 after he had filed his opinion. The 1914 and 1926 acts did not
 merely change the form of contract, as Hudson contended, but
 added provisions designed to make the excess land idea
 effective. The legislative history of both acts indicated support
 for the acreage limitation-part of a pattern of consistent
 congressional backing for the 160-acre law from the passage
 of the Newlands Act through the rejection of the Elliott
 amendment.35
 The administrative route was more circuitous than Downey's
 legislative exemptions, yet exemption by bureaucracy raised
 34Howard R. Stinson to Fix, Dec. 5, 1947, file 742, RG 115; 68 I.D. 370, 382-383;
 Taylor, "The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy," 487-488.
 3568 I.D. 370, 388-390, 395.
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 perhaps greater dangers. The legal interpretations could apply
 to any reclamation project, and their very subtlety made them
 more insidious. The operation recalled James Willard Hurst's
 observation about the momentous consequences that could
 flow from obscure legal processes. "By enlarging or restricting
 the scope of such concepts as 'property' or 'navigability,' "
 Hurst wrote, "lawmakers could favor one interest and subor-
 dinate another, in a fashion so quick and quiet, so economical
 of analysis, seeming so routinely logical in its application of
 accepted values, that... the ranking of interests" could pro-
 ceed virtually unnoticed. Perhaps equally serious, the willing-
 ness of midcentury liberals such as Cohen, Chapman, and
 Straus to revise laws administratively to fit their policy goals
 betrayed a contempt for the law itself. In 1951 Chapman,
 frustrated with Congress's failure to pass legislation authoriz-
 ing federal development of the oil-rich "tidelands," induced
 his solicitor to file a severely strained interpretation of the
 Surplus Property Act which gave him the authority to start a
 leasing program. The act applied to such mundane items as
 surplus typewriters, however, and Congress administered a
 humiliating rebuke to Chapman's legal maneuvering.36
 No matter how deficient its scholarship, the Hudson-Cohen
 opinion furnished the legal rationale for the technical com-
 pliance drive. Although one of the most important solicitor's
 opinions during the Truman period, the bureau omitted it
 from the department's annual compilation of decisions; it was
 available only in mimeograph. The opinion was not submitted
 for formal secretarial approval, but bureau and department
 officials accepted it as an authoritative policy statement. As
 Secretary, Chapman informally praised the technical compli-
 ance program, at least on older projects; he misleadingly cited
 the lump-sum payment device as being "in strict accord with
 the Reclamation laws as determined by the Associate Solicitor."
 These informal affirmations were soon reinforced by a string
 of contracts implementing the lump-sum payout provision. In
 36James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber
 Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 208; Clayton R. Koppes,
 "Oscar L. Chapman: A Liberal at the Interior Department, 1933-1953" (Ph.D.
 dissertation, University of Kansas, 1974), 403-415.
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 December 1947 Straus issued Administrative Letter 303, in
 which he asked field officers to initiate action in accordance
 with the opinion. One of the first contracts was signed with the
 Klamath Drainage District in 1948, where accelerated payment
 lifted the limitations for fifteen ownerships with 13,489 ex-
 cess acres, or a mean of 899 acres. Lump-sum contracts were
 negotiated with fifty-eight water-user districts from 1948
 through 1952 and received the approval of the Secretary's
 office. In several cases, other aspects of the renegotiated
 contracts required submission to Congress, and the repayment
 provisions received congressional approval as part of the
 overall perfunctory review. Straus's strategy was bringing
 forth much paper compliance on older projects.37
 The wide-reaching implications of accelerated payout be-
 came clear when the bureau moved to apply it to new projects,
 notably the Central Valley. Secretary Chapman had assured
 uneasy congressmen in early 1951 that the lump-sum device
 was not being considered for any California project. Later that
 year he learned from an article in the San Francisco News that
 Straus was thinking of applying Administrative Letter 303 to
 the area served by the Pine Flat Dam. So long as the Corps of
 Engineers kept control of the dam, the large landowners in the
 Kings River service area hoped to receive irrigation water
 untroubled by the acreage limitation. Under the "Folsom
 Formula" enunciated by Truman in 1948, the Corps of Engi-
 neers was to transfer control of the dam to the bureau when it
 became operational. Reclamation law would apply, as New
 Dealers had made certain in the 1944 act. A stroke of Truman's
 37Chapman to John F. Shelley, March 29, 1951, Secretary's Reading File, Chapman
 Papers; Commissioner of Reclamation, Administrative Letter 303, Dec. 16, 1947; Boke
 to Straus, Feb. 23, 1950, file 742, RG 115; U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Excess Land
 Provisions of the Federal Reclamation Laws and the Payment of Charges (2 parts, Washington,
 D.C., 1956, copy, Dept. of the Interior Library), I, 51-53, appendix 45. In one of the
 supreme ironies of the 160-acre-law controversy, conservative congressmen decided to
 make Straus and Richard Boke serve as symbolic scapegoats of New Deal redistribution
 politics. The House attached a rider to an appropriations bill in the spring of 1948
 which required that the commissioner of reclamation and the regional directors have
 ten years' practical engineering experience. Neither Straus nor Boke was an engineer.
 Spiced by unfounded accusations of disloyalty, the controversy over the Straus-Boke
 rider dragged on while both men continued to serve without pay. The rider finally
 lapsed on June 30, 1949, and Congress that fall voted them their back pay. See Koppes,
 "The Bureau of Reclamation's Excess Land Law," 54-58.
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 pen would have resolved the issue in favor of reclamation law,
 but he left the situation for the Eisenhower administration,
 which eventually effected the transfer. Anxious to add Pine
 Flat to his empire, Straus was willing to abandon the acreage
 limitation-one of the crucial policy distinctions between the
 corps and the bureau. He advised Chapman that a lump-sum
 payment of construction charges by the Kings River water
 users should be accepted as lifting the acreage limitation
 because such an arrangement would follow "entrenched"
 department policy enunciated in opinion M-35004. The Secre-
 tary avoided committing himself, saying merely that he wanted
 his staff to give the matter priority attention. Nothing hap-
 pened, however, until October 1952, when defenders of the
 160-acre law found their fears borne out. The bureau office in
 Fresno, California, assured the Kings River district that "the
 proposed lump-sum payment contract, which you requested
 and we furnished, would remove the excess land restrictions of
 Reclamation Law .. ."38
 Supporters of the 160-acre law mobilized and, rightfully
 suspicious of the Reclamation Bureau's and Interior Depart-
 ment's intentions, carried their appeal to Truman. James G.
 Patton, president of the National Farmers Union, warned the
 chief executive: "Unless you act fast and decisively, your
 Administration is about to go down in history, ironically, as the
 one that pulled the plug on American family farm policy."
 Truman appeared uninformed on the issue, however, and
 passed Patton's letter to Chapman for an explanation of "what
 he is talking about." The Missourian had issued generalized
 statements in support of the family farm; unlike his predeces-
 sor, however, he had not publicly endorsed the excess land law.
 In fact in 1952 Truman signed a bill raising the acreage limit to
 480 acres on the San Luis Valley Project in Colorado, despite
 38Alfred C. Wolf to Fred Aandahl, March 19, 1953, box 1, Program Staff Central
 Files, RG 48; Chapman to Shelley, March 29, 1951, Secretary's Reading File, Chapman
 Papers; Straus to Chapman, Jan. 18 and May 15, 1952; Chapman to Straus, June 2,
 1952, in U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Excess Land Provisions, I, appendices 36, 42, 43. On
 the "Folsom Formula," see Official File 620, box 1515, Harry S. Truman Papers, esp.
 Frank Pace to Truman, "Past History of Action with Respect to Central Valley,
 California," Aug. 5, 1949.
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 Chapman's objections. To Truman reclamation meant chiefly
 expansion of economic capacity.39
 The Secretary responded in December 1952 with a brace of
 memoranda that further clouded the situation and gravely
 disappointed supporters of the acreage limitation. The memo-
 randa were written by the Program Staff, a small group of
 policy experts who functioned as Chapman's liberal con-
 science. In a memorandum to Truman, Chapman implied, as
 he had earlier, that the Hudson-Cohen opinion was correct.
 The Secretary acknowledged that the bureau had "accepted
 accelerated payout from some excess landowners" but only on
 older projects with long-standing violations. "At no time have I
 concurred in a general policy that lump-sum or accelerated
 payments would be an acceptable alternative to the application
 of the excess lands limitation," he said. The memo to Truman
 seemed to mean that, while Chapman would not apply the
 Hudson-Cohen opinion to new projects, it was a valid legal
 interpretation and was acceptable for older projects.40
 At the same time, however, Chapman sent a memorandum
 to Straus that seemed to contradict two vital points. First, "in
 accordance with the policy statements set forth" in the memo-
 randum to the President, the Secretary said, "I am instructing
 you... to refuse to accept any lump-sum or accelerated
 payment of construction charges from any individual or or-
 ganization which would, under Opinion M-35004 as construed
 by Administrative Letter 303," free the individuals or organiza-
 tions from the acreage limitations. Chapman specifically told
 the commissioner not to negotiate such a contract on the Kings
 River. Second, the Secretary denied that the opinion carried
 secretarial approval and represented departmental policy.
 Since the opinion did not set forth any policy, Chapman said, it
 had not been submitted to or approved by the Secretary.41
 The memoranda to the President and the commissioner
 contradicted each other on both policy and law. It was clear
 39Patton to Truman, Nov. 24, 1952, box 1, Program Staff Central Files, RG 48;
 Kathka, "Bureau of Reclamation," 99-101; Pelz, Federal Reclamation Laws, II, 1083.
 40Chapman to Truman, Dec. 24, 1952, box 1, Program Staff Central Files, RG 48.
 41Chapman to Straus, Dec. 23, 1952, ibid. (emphasis added).
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 that Chapman would not apply accelerated payout as an
 overall policy. But on older projects the presidential memoran-
 dum said lump-sum payments were acceptable, while the
 memo to the commissioner said they were not. If the latter
 were correct, all the contracts recently signed and endorsed in
 the presidential memo, including thirty-six Minidoka project
 contracts approved by Under Secretary Vernon Northrop in
 the past two weeks, would be invalid. Furthermore, the Sec-
 retary's attempt to separate the legal and policy issues-two
 halves of the same walnut-blinked at reality. Opinion M-35004
 had emerged from the bureau's technical compliance cam-
 paign, which was a matter of policy. In any event Chapman
 implicitly approved the Hudson-Cohen opinion and cited it
 explicitly as the basis for the accelerated-payout contracts he
 had approved. The department treated the opinion as authori-
 tative until it was specifically limited by the solicitor in 1957 and
 overruled by the solicitor in 1961. Taken together the actions
 of December 12-24-the Minidoka contracts and Chapman's
 memoranda-had confused more than clarified the issue. It
 was as if the Secretary had faced a multiple-choice test with the
 options "all," "none," and "some of the above" and checked all
 three.42
 Incredulous, Straus conferred with Chapman on January 6,
 1953. He recounted the meeting in a memorandum for the
 files, which was apparently the only record made of the session.
 According to Straus, Chapman said "he had not realized the
 effect of applying the order" and told the commissioner to
 disregard it. The commissioner considered that policy had thus
 reverted to the status quo ante. Straus overlooked, however, or
 perhaps was not informed of, Chapman's final statement on
 the question. On January 17 the Secretary wrote Senator Paul
 Douglas a letter in which he reiterated the substance of policy
 in the directive to Straus but left the Hudson-Cohen opinion
 untouched. Three days later Chapman retired from office,
 leaving policy as murky as the tule fogs that sometimes
 enveloped the Central Valley.43
 "ZU.S. Dept. of the Interior, Excess Land Provisions, 51-53; 68 I.D. 370, 399, 402.
 43Straus memorandum for the record, Feb. 6, 1953, box 1, Program Staff Central
 Files, RG 48; Chapman to Douglas, Jan. 17, 1953, Case File Correspondence 26.3,
 Paul H. Douglas Papers, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Ill.
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 Nearly everyone connected with the issue was unhappy.
 Straus feared the "fuzzy" and "schizophrenic" situation
 blocked the application of accelerated payments on the Kings
 River. Under Secretary Northrop considered his superior's
 instructions "obviously... ill advised in the form issued."
 Fred A. Clarenbach of the Program Staff threw up his hands
 and wondered, "What is present Department policy?" But
 Chapman had particularly disappointed the liberals who sup-
 ported the redistributive principle. "We certainly deserved
 better from the avowed friends of acreage limitation," said
 Douglas sadly. In a final letter to Chapman, James Patton said:
 "Oscar, I don't believe that your memorandum to the Commis-
 sioner of Reclamation answers the problem that I have
 posed. .. ." The farm leader pointed out that the Secretary had
 done nothing more than promise not to approve lump-sum
 payment contracts on new projects during his few remaining
 days in office. But the key elements-Administrative Letter
 303 and the Hudson-Cohen legal opinion-remained intact to
 be implemented by later administrations.44
 The Truman administration's legacy differed markedly
 from its predecessor's. The Roosevelt administration had
 resurrected a nearly forgotten principle and fought to main-
 tain it against severe odds. Liberals from 1946 to 1953, lured
 by economic growth and bureaucratic desire, buried the policy
 considerations in a blizzard of legal technicalities. At the crucial
 moment when federal policy could have triggered some redis-
 tribution of landholding in the Central Valley, Truman-era
 liberals elected instead to use federal subsidies to reinforce the
 most skewed land-tenure pattern in the nation.
 The technical compliance strategy that Straus had pioneered
 continued to characterize the bureau's approach to the 160-
 acre law into the 1970s. The accelerated payout mechanism
 was used by many water districts, particularly in California, in
 an attempt to buy their way out of the acreage limitation. They
 were finally rebuffed by the federal courts, the branch of
 government which has been the staunchest defender of the
 "Vernon Northrop to Bradley, Feb. 18, 1953; Fred Clarenbach memo for the files,
 Feb. 3, 1953, box 1, Program Staff Central Files, RG 48; Paul Douglas to Taylor,
 Jan. 23, 1953, Case File Correspondence 26.3, Douglas Papers; Patton to Chapman,
 Jan. 12, 1953, file 8-1, RG 48.
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 excess land law. In addition, a "lawyer's paradise" of legal
 technicalities, ranging from deeding excess lands to family
 members to apportioning 160 acres per person in investment
 trusts, has produced a paradox: The bureau had attained
 almost perfect paper compliance on its projects in California,
 but a subsidy to the largest interests was perpetuated. Of the
 1,287,000 excess acres on reclamation projects in 1970, some
 1,097,000 acres were found in the bureau's Mid-Pacific region,
 which included the Central Valley.45
 The 1976 ruling by the Ninth Circuit triggered the most
 intensive review of the acreage limitation principle since the
 Truman period. What the outcome will be remains unclear.
 Secretary of the Interior Cecil D. Andrus proposed in 1978
 that the limit be raised to 320 acres per individual landowner
 or 640 acres for husband and wife, with the possibility of
 leasing an additional 160 acres apiece, for a maximum of 960
 acres. If this proposal were adopted, the heavy subsidies to the
 largest farmers and corporations would stop, but medium-
 sized farmers would continue to benefit. The Andrus com-
 promise seems destined to satisfy neither the large landowners,
 who would prefer to see the present situation perpetuated, nor
 agrarian reform groups such as National Land for People,
 which call for strict enforcement of the 160-acre standard.
 Nevertheless, if 160 acres as a figure seems doomed, the
 acreage limitation as a symbol retains power and relevance. For
 in putting public water on private land the federal reclamation
 program has always raised one of the key challenges of public
 policy: Which groups should benefit from subsidies contri-
 buted by the entire public? The current controversy, like that
 in the period 1933 to 1953, may offer some insights into
 whether the federal government will use subsidies to reinforce
 or to alter the distribution of power in society.46
 45House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Water and
 Power Resources, Hearings on Acreage Limitation Provisions of Reclamation Law, 94 Cong.,
 2 sess., (1976), 20, 125; Charles R. Renda, "Owner Eligibility Restrictions-Acreage and
 Residency," Natural Resources Lawyer, VIII (1976), 265; Hogan, Acreage Limitation in the
 Federal Reclamation Program, 127-177.
 "New York Times, April 14, 1978.
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